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American Business Cycles since World War IT: 
Historical Behaviour and Statistical Representation 
Christina Romer, in her 1994 paper Remeasuring Business Cycles, emphasizes the 
decisive role played by dates of peaks and troughs in the 'reference cycle' in 'forming 
impressions about macroeconomic fluctuations '. They are usually thought of 'as the 
turning points of business cycles ' , but in the sense of a 'consensus of turning points in 
many specific series' rather than 'extremes in anyone aggregate '. The reference cycle, 
'a much used tool of macroeconomic analysis ', is the result of an ' extremely impressive ' 
research progranune carried out by Arthur Burns and Wesley Mitchell at the National 
Bureau of Economic Research between the wars, described and summarized in 
Measuring Business Cycles (1946). Romer considers the latter to be ' one of the most 
respected books in American macroeconomics ', and the work of Burns and Mitchell in 
dating business cycles to be 'monumental' . 1 
The reference cycle is normally represented by single aggregates or indicator variables, 
examples of which are the composite indicators published monthly in the US Department 
of Commerce Survey of ClIrrent Business. It is usual for commentators on current 
business conditions to talk of activities which tend to ' lead the cycle', like stock market 
indices, or which 'Iag', like employment rates. For many years it has been assumed that 
most indicators, and the sectors they represent, behave in the same manner from cycle to 
cycle - stock markets always ' lead' and employment always ' lags '. This is based not on 
observation of contemporary behaviour, but rather on the orthodox interpretation of the 
interwar NBER progranune that business-cycle behaviour is alike in all historical 
episodes and that expansions and contractions in the various sectors of the economy 
happen more or less simultaneously. 
lRomer (1994), pp. 573- 576. 
There is, however, much evidence to the contrary in NBER statistical results. It is the 
purpose of this paper to extend the NBER approach to the analysis of economic 
fluctuations in the postwar US economy in order to assess the extent of conformity of 
sectoral fluctuations . 
I. Introduction 
Burns and Mitchell defined business cycles as 'recurrent but not periodic ' expansions and 
contractions, occurring 'at about the same time in many economic activities ', lasting from 
one to about 12 years.2 The expansions and contractions in each of the 'many activities ' 
- known as ' specific cycles' - were, in this view, well- behaved; that is, the relative 
timings of their peaks and troughs were invariant from one episode to the next. It has thus 
been assumed since the definition was published that specific-cycle ' comovements ' can 
be represented by the ' reference cycle'. 
The influence of Measuring Business Cycles and its reference chronology cannot be 
over-emphasized. There are numerous examples in the macroeconomic literature. Lucas, 
in his theoretical ('real business cycle') analysis of comovements, cites Burns and 
Mitchelfs 'documentation ' as the authoritative empirical description of short- run 
economic behaviour. He argues that 'although there is no theoretical reason to anticipate 
it, one is led by the facts to conclude that...business cycles are all alike [emphasis in 
original]" that is, 'output movements across broadly defined sectors move together' , 
although possibly with differential amplitudes.3 Cooley and Prescott follow this approach 
in a 1995 real business cycle paper, citing as the relevant 'business cycle facts ' the 
'comovements of variables that Burns and Mitchell worked so hard to document and that 
2Measuring Business Cycles, p. 3. 
3(1977) p. 10. On p. 9: 'production oLdurables exhibits much greater amplitude 
than ... nondurables '. 
2 
Robert Lucas emphasized as the defining features of the business cycle ' . 4 Blanchard and 
Fischer, in their advanced textbook Lectures on Macroeconomics, argue that the interwar 
NBER statistical evidence was ' the most systematic collection of business cycle facts ', 
which, ' using a reference chronology of business cycles ... documented the existence of 
regular cycles' as well as the dynamic properties of 'a large number of [time] series 
relative to the stages of the cycle .. .'s 
Applications of the reference cycle are also found in the econometrics literature. King and 
Plosser's 1994 study of the stochastic properties of a real business cycle model directly 
follows the statistical measures of conformity and of average patterns of fluctuation 
developed by Burns and MitchelI.6 Stock and Watson' s work on coincident and leading 
indicators, published between 1989 and 1992, takes as 'primitive' the page-three 
defInition.' These authors ask ' what do the leading indicators lead? ' The answer is the 
reference cycle, which they distinguish from fluctuations in GNP; although no single 
aggregate can be a proxy for the dynamic behaviour of the 'many activities', the reference 
dates accurately capture 'comovements in a broad range of macroeconomic aggregates '. 8 
This tends to be the consensus view in applied research. in her 1994 study of economic 
stabiIization Romer relies on a comparison of pre- and postwar reference dates to identify 
changes in US 'business-cycle' durations over time; and cites examples of other authors 
using the reference cycle for such comparisons.9 Romer's object is to determine whether, 
as the original NBER reference dates suggest, pre- 1939 ' recessions ' were more severe 
4(1995) p. 26. 
s(1989) p. 275. 
6(1994) Sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
'(1 989) p. 353 . 
81bid., pp. 352- 353 . 
9(1994) p. 573, note I. 
3 
and protracted than those since the war. Her approach is to re- compute the prewar 
reference cycle using an industrial production series whose postwar turning points occur 
at about the same time as the NBER reference turns. The new prewar dates give reference 
contractions which are shorter and hence less severe than those identified by the original 
chronology, from which she concludes that postwar stabilization is illusory. 
Watson (1994), in another stabilization study, compares reference measures derived by 
different methods, and demonstrates how sensitive are their observed cyclical durations 
to the volatility of the time series on which they are based. He constructs a postwar 
chronology using series similar to those employed by Burns and Mitchell, and then 
compares it to the NBER dates. Because his industrial production indices contain specific 
cycles not corresponding to 'movements in other series', Watson ignores these ' extra ' 
cycles in fixing reference dates.10 He concludes that apparent changes in durations in the 
postwar period are the artifact of his time series, which are more volatile than those used 
by the NBER." 
Reference measures are the basis for the identification of peaks and troughs in the 
'business cycle' in the US economy. Romer argues that the procedures followed by the 
reference--cycle dating committee of the NBER for the US economy 'were laid down in 
more or less final form ' in Measuring Business Cyc/es. 12 This appears to be the case, 
especially the requirement that an episode have sufficient duration, diffUSion and depth 
to count as a referencelbusiness cycle movement. These '3-D ' criteria, as they have 
become known, are first discussed on page 72. 
10(1994) p. 39. 
"Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
12(1994) p. 576. 
4 
Postwar NBER business-cycle research has been conditioned by Measuring Business 
Cycles. For example, as late as 1986 Moore and Zamowitz endorsed the page-three 
definition with certain modifications, recognizing in particular that as a consequence of 
postwar economic growth specific cycles are usually 'asymmetric in that expansions 
typically exceed contractions in size and duration. ' I l The influence of growth rates on 
specific-cycle dynamics had earlier been recognized by Mitchell. In his 1927 volume, he 
appeared to equate them, speculating that cyclical fluctuations might really be ' alternating 
accelerations and retardations in the pace of a more fundamental process' (i .e., growth).14 
Recognition of growth asymmetries is thus not a significant departure from interwar 
NBER thinking. 
Contrary to the conventional postwar interpretation of their statistical evidence, however, 
Burns and Mitchell actually found historical behaviour very complex. There is no clear 
evidence in Measuring Business Cycles of any 'documentation' of comovements. 
Mitchell himself always stressed the unique features of each historical episode, that the 
sequence of specific-cycle turning points was not well-behaved, and that consequently 
no single reference measure could adequately represent the complexities of short- run 
macroeconomic fluctuations .15 
On the contrary, the page- three 'definition ' was intended as a ' tool of research ', 
analogous to other such definitions in the 'observational sciences ', rather than as an 
accurate description of historical behaviour. It was ' subject to revision or abandonment' 
if not supported empirically.'6 On page four the authors argued that in order to observe 
empirical business cycles a specification that tells the observer 'where to look and what 
I l( 1986) p. 735. 
14(1927) p. 224. 
'5Measuring Business Cycles, pp. 3-8. 
'61bid., p. 3. 
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to look for' was required. Although by that time they claimed to have found 
'considerable' evidence to support 'every clause .. . an intensive study .. .is necessary if we 
are to ascertain conclusively whether the many economic activities really fluctuate in 
unison as the definition states' . 17 It was thus not apparent in 1946 how ' general' was the 
' consensus' of 'cyclical' phases in the 'many activities' . The issue could only be 
addressed by obtaining and analysing a great deal more data. 18 
In fact Measuring Business Cycles contains as many questions as answers for the student 
of historical fluctuations. For example, the occurrence of 'cyclical' movements at ' about 
the same time' allowed the possibility of ' leads' and ' lags' among the variables in relation 
to the ' general cycle '. This, however, contradicts Burns and Mitchell' s stipulation that 
' cyclical turns are concentrated around certain points in time; for if there were no 
bunching of cyclical tums, there would be no business cycles answering to our definition 
[emphasis added)' . 19 Of course there might even be 'several sets of general cycles numing 
concurrently', all of different periodicity but 'combining to produce the variability our 
defmition admits.' The turning points themselves raised questions of identification: for 
expansions and contractions 'seem to be intenupted by movements in the opposite 
direction, and some cycles apparently have double or triple peaks or troughs ... attaining 
considerable proportions. '20 
As a consequence of these complexities, the procedure for identifying specific cycles was 
not straightforward. Burns and Mitchell defined these as fluctuations lasting ' at least 15 
months' and at most about 12 years in individual time series. Although elaborate rules for 
'matching' specific-cycle peaks and troughs to reference turns were developed, these 
17Ibid. , p. 5. 
18lbid., p. 6. 
19lbid. 
2°lbid., pp. 7-8. 
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required considerable judgment in their application; for the authors could find ' no 
mechanical [i.e., objective] device that insures sensible results'. The rules were designed 
to ' weed out "extra" specific cycles, that is, specific-cycle movements wuelated to 
business [or synonymously, reference] cycles ' (thereby ensuring the ' sensible results').21 
In his final volume Mitchell conceded that such an approach was' argument in a circle ' 22 
Setting the reference dates presented a greater problem because the dynamics of the 
'many activities ' appeared so divergent. It was difficult to ' determine how they fit 
together' . Burns and MitchelI found it impractical to parameterize the criteria for 
reference peaks and troughs in the same way as for specific cycles. They gave as an 
example ten employment series showing both ' extra ' and 'skipped' cycles ; and ' turning 
zones ' rather than tight clusters of peaks and troughS.23 
Bums later found a 'wide dispersion of specific-cycle peaks and troughs ' in 600 interwar 
US time series. In a 1961 paper he argued that it was 'naiVe ' to suppose that most 
economic activities reached turning points at the same time. Only if all series were 'rising 
and falling in unison' could business cycles be represented 'exclusively [by] aggregate 
activity '. His solution to the dispersion problem was to propose two cycles: the first, 
' seen', in the aggregate itself; and the second, 'unseen', in the 'distribution of expansions 
and contractions within the aggregate' . In the latter there should be an increase in 
turning- point numbers month by month until a reference turn is reached; yet he found 
that in interwar data the maximum percentage of turns in any month was only about 15, 
and that the 'clusters' of specific- cycle peaks and troughs could be spread by as much 
as two years around reference turnS24 
2IIbid. , p. 118. 
22Whal Happens during Business Cycles (1951), p.77. 
23(1946) Table 14, pp. 68-69. 
24( 1961) p. 17 and Chart 2.1, p. IS . 
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Owing to these complexities, leading indicators have had mixed success. As early as 1958 
Alexander pointed out that ' diffusion' indices (which record the percentage of series in 
a given data set which show increases in levels in anyone time period) often gave false 
signals.2S Although the Stock and Watson coincident index performed well, their leading 
indicator failed to predict the US reference peak in 1990. They relied on a previously 
stable historical relationship between fmancial markets and the real sector which in this 
instance, according to Robert E. Hall, experienced a ' remarkable ... breakdown ' .26 Hall, 
chairman of the NBER dating committee, gives all the 'recessions ' since 1967 as 
examples of reference episodes which have been difficult to identify. 
II. Breaking the Circle of Argument: an Algorithm for the Identification of Specific 
Cycles 
The previous research thus leaves unanswered the most important questions about the 
reliability of the reference dates, their ability to summarize the dynamics of the 'many 
activities ', and by implication the degree of historical comovement. Burns and Mitchell, 
on whom all this research relies for 'documentation', produced evidence which points 
more to divergences than to comovements. Their analyses were, of course, carried out 
before national income accounts were available for the United States on a quarterly or 
monthly basis, which led them to question the reliability of their own data. In any case 
the NBER has itself always been aware of the complexities of specific-cyc1e behaviour, 
as the comments of Moore and Zamowitz indicate. Although these authors argue that 
specific-cycle peaks and troughs show 'rather defmite points of concentration' , the 
evidence they adduce is from the period up to 1939.27 
2S(I 958) p. 636. 
26Stock and Watson (1989) ; Hall (199112) p. 2. 
27(1986) p. 747. The evidence is from Moore (1961) Chart 7.3, pp. 198- 201. 
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The reference-dating process, as described by Hall, considers a large volume of 
time-series data in fixing turning points, but focuses on a few variables as indicators of 
' general conditions ' . In identifying the 1990 peak, for example, the data that 'most 
strongly influenced the committee' were the real national income, real sales, industrial 
production and nonagricultural employment series.la However important these time series 
may be, they are not representations of the whole of economic activity. Hall moreover 
describes each reference date as a 'compromise' rather than as a well- defmed turning 
point. 
The question raised by the reference cycle can thus be framed as a variant of Stock and 
Watson's leading- indicator question: viz. with what do these dates actually coincide? 
That is, do the many activities conform in their specific cycles to any single set of dates, 
however powerful may be the technique of fixing them? From this a broader question 
arises: do postwar historical 'business cycles ' really display the empirical regularities -
comovements, stable leads and lags, predictable differences in amplitudes, and 
growth- induced asyrnrnetries - assumed in the literature? 
These issues can only properly be addressed by an examination of historical data for 
' broadly defined output sectors ' to determine the timing of specific-cycle peaks and 
troughs. Operationally this means direct observation of peaks and troughs in each time 
series. The presence of comovements implies the following behavioural characteristics: 
(1) that turning point in most series are ' bunched' , or ' clustered'; i.e., they reach 
their peaks and trough at about the same time; 
(2) that, in addition, approximately the same number of specific cycles is found 
in each of the series; and 
(3) that, for those series whose turning points are not found within the cluster, 
their leads or lags are comparatively stable and predictable. 
28Hall (1 991/2) p. I and Figure I. 
9 
The approach advocated here is similar to Burns and Mitchell ' s identification criteria for 
specific cycles, but free of an a priori reference chronology, which thus avoids the 
circularity and inconsistencies of arbitrary 'weeding'. That is, peaks and troughs are 
directly-observable, local time- series maxima or minima which are identified by 
applying the same quantitative algorithm to all series. 
Therefore a peak is identified if within a specified number of time- periods preceding and 
succeeding it there is no other observation with an equal or higher value; and a trough 
occurs if there is none of equal or lower value. Formally, a 'peak' is a local maximum X; 
in a time series {X, } whenever X,> max { X,_k , .. . ,X,_I} and 
X, > max {X, . I ' ... , X, d }; a local minimum (' trough') is as above, but with > max{ ... } 
replaced by < min{ ... } . 29 The parameter k determines the ' window length' , or number of 
time-periods over which the algorithm searches before and after the current observation. 
Multiple turning points are also allowed for in the implementation. This comparatively 
simple criterion will presently be shown as sufficient to allow direct comparisons of 
specific-cycle durations and timing relations. 
Bums and Mitchell claimed to have evaluated more than 800 time series. They did not, 
of course, have available the comprehensive macroeconomic time- series data reported 
monthly and quarterly from 1947. Prewar NBER analysis was thus forced to rely on large 
numbers of series as proxies for the 'broadly based output sectors ']O It was in response 
to such statistical deficiencies that the national income and product accounts were 
developed by Simon Kuznets and his team. Any study of the postwar US economy can 
therefore be based on the summary NIPA Table 1.2 time series - real quarterly GNP and 
29The implementation is by computer program. Source code and output tables are 
available from the author on request. 
3~omer, however, believes that Burns and Mitchell fixed their reference cycle from only 
two composite, 'detrended' indices. See (1994) p. 580. 
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its sectoral components (as published periodically in Survey ofCurrel1l Business). This 
was the approach advocated by Mitchell throughout the 1930s, and is the one he would 
have followed had the data been available. As such, the use of national income 
accounting data follows NB ER methods in both letter and spirit. 
As it happens, the data are accessible in a convenient form from 1947 to 1983 in the 
historical appendix to the 1986 NBER conference volume The American Business Cycle 
compiled by Nathan Balke. The present analysis uses Balke 's variables, extended to the 
end of 1994: 
Gross national product 
Durable goods 
Nondurable goods and services 
Residential structures 
Nonresidential structures 
Producers durable equipment 
Changes in business inventories 
Exports 
Imports 
Government purchases of goods and services 
In addition, the Table 1.2 sectoral totals for personal consumption expenditure and private 
domestic investment are included. Consumption is the total of durable and nondurable 
goods and services; investment is the aggregate of the two structures series, durable 
equipment and inventories. 
This data set gives a balance between detail and generality, and enables an economical, 
' top down' , strategy to be implemented. As an initial step these variables will be 
examined for conformity with GNP. The latter, representing total output, can be 
interpreted as a reference measure. That is, if comovements are present in the postwar US 
economy then specific cycles in most series should conform to those in GNP. If the 
required conformity is found, then the components of these Table 1.2 series can in turn 
be examined; if not, then no further investigation is required. Eight hundred series are 
hence unnecessary ab initio. 
11 
Table 1 shows the specific cycles in real quarterly postwar GNP found by the algorithm, 
and also the NBER and Romer reference dates. Setting the window- length parameter k=3 
identifies a peak/trough if there are no observations of higherllower value within ±three 
quarters. Twning points in GNP (columns 5 and 6) are very close to those of the NBER' s 
and Romer's reference cycles (colwnns 1-4). The latter are slightly closer to those of the 
NBER than are turns in GNP, as measured by mean absolute deviations from NBER 
dates. These are 0.33 and 0.78 quarters respectively for Romer and GNP. Such a result 
is not surprising: Romer's dates were constructed to reproduce those of the NBER; 
turning points in GNP have been identified without a prior reference measure. What is 
surprising, however, is how closely these sets of reference dates track GNP peaks and 
troughs: both have the same number of turning points; none is adrift by more than three 
quarters, and then on only one occasion - the NBER trough of 1970. 
Given the difficulties encountered by the NBER dating conunittee in fixing turning points 
since the 1960s, such discrepancies are to be expected. In fact the largest deviation of the 
NBER reference turns from those of GNP, apart from 1970, is only one quarter; and in 
four cases they coincide. The reference measures therefore appear accurately to be 
tracking fluctuations in aggregate output. Whether this is the same as comovements in the 
' many activities ' cannot be determined without further statistical analysis, results of 
which are given in the next section. 
If the twning- point algorithm is to follow Bums and Mitchell ' s methods closely, then the 
minimum specific-cycle duration should be 15 months (five quarters), and the maximum 
12 years (48 quarters). Application to the 11 other NIPA variables produces a small 
number of instances outside these limits. Table 2 shows three occurrences below the 
minimum, all of four quarters' duration. Of the 120 complete specific cycles in the 
sample, only 2Y:, percent of specific cycles are hence below Burns and Mitchell's 
minimum. There are two above the maximum: one of 151 quarters in nondurable goods 
and services; and another of 81 quarters, in personal consumption expenditure. These are 
12 
again proportionately minimal, at 1.7 percent of the total of specific cycles. Both are too 
long in duration to qualify as specific cycles. Nondurables have no specific cycles at all 
according to Burns and Mitchell's criteria; yet ignoring these series would not improve 
matters. A 'skipped' specific cycle cannot be 'weeded out' . Discarding the series 
altogether would defeat the object of the analysis, which is to determine whether 
comovements occur naturally in many activities when a consistent turning-point 
algorithm is applied. The six instances falling outside the limits are hence included 
because they highlight the difficulties inherent in the dating of ' business cycles ', and 
because they are too few in number materially to alter the statistical results. 
Much has been made of 'growth cycles ' in the postwar literature. These are deftned as 
sequences of turning points in series from which a deterministic time trend has been 
subtracted. Romer argues that trend- adjusted series were probably employed by the 
NBER in the identification ofpre- World War II reference dates. The former can yield 
turning points very different from those of the unadjusted series if the data have 
pronounced secular tendencies] 1 As an illustration of this property the algorithm has been 
applied to the residuals from the regression of GNP on a linear time trend and constant 
term: i.e., G N Pt = a + pt + Et' The result is given in Table I, columns 7 and 8. There are 
more turning points in the regression residuaJs than in the original series; none of the 
former coincides with any in the latter. Moreover the residuals are found to be highly 
autocorrelated, indicating that the regression is misspecified. 32 This confirms Romer's 
view that trend-adjustment is not a sensible approach to the identification of specific 
cycles . 
ID. Results 
31(1994) pp. 574- 575. 
32Exarnples of autocorrelation coefficients are: first order, 0.98; sixth order, 0.78 . 
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The comovement hypothesis requires that all series have the same nwnber of specific 
cycles (and approximately the same nwnber of turning points) and that the timing 
relations are stable and weighted in favour of coincidences. This section gives results 
from the application of the turning- point algorithm explained in the preceding section. 
Evidence of asyrnrnetries and of differential amplitudes is also considered. 
Comovements: the Evidence. Postwar turning points are listed in detail for the three 
principal components of GNP - government purchases, conswnption and investment -
in Table 3. These do not generally coincide: peaks and troughs in all four series are found 
only in 1953, 1973/5,1980 and 1989/91 , equivalent to only half the total nwnber of 
specific cycles in GNP. There are instances of turning points in component series having 
no equivalent in GNP and vice versa. Consumption had 'missing ' turning points (i.e., 
specific cycles) in 1949150, 1957/58, 1969/70 and 1981/82. Government purchases had 
'extras' in the 1970s and 1980s, as did investment in the 1950s, 1960s and 1980s. All 
three series in Table 3 had at least one multiple turning point: i.e. , extra peaks in the 
second quarters of 1971 and 1981 for government purchases; an extra peak at 1962:2 and 
a trough at 1967:2 for investment; and a peak at 1981:4 in consumption. In fact GNP is 
unique among the NIPA series under consideration in having no multiple turning points. 
Even the 'weeding' of extraneous turning points, one of the main elements of Burns and 
Mitchell ' s approach, does not improve the fit of postwar specific cycles, as Table 4 
shows. Here those peaks and troughs which do not have an 'equivalent' in GNP have 
been discarded - equivalent being in this case a turning point which is either closest to 
one in GNP, or else one which occupies the same position in the sequence. As an 
example, the peak in government purchases at 1949:3 is closest to the GNP peak at 
1948:4; the peak at 1964:2 in the former occupies the same position as that in the latter 
at 1960: 1, because there is none closer in time (see also Tables 1 and 3). Seven 
non-equivalent turning points in government purchases (32 percent of its total), 12 in 
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investment (40 percent), and one in consumption (seven percent), shown in Table 4A, 
have been weeded according to these criteria. 
To qualify as a co movement, a sectoral turning point ought to occur in the same quarter 
as one in GNP; but even when this criterion is relaxed slightly there is little evidence of 
confonnity among these sectoral components. Those 'weeded' turning points in Table 4 
occurring within ±two quarters of a GNP equivalent are marked with an asterisk. There 
are four in government purchases (i .e., 22 percent of the weeded total), nine in investment 
(half the total) and four in consumption (one-third). The only instance in which all four 
weeded series turn within ±two quarters of each other was the peak at 1953:2 which 
coincided with the end of the Korean War. Thus, even applying Bums and Mitchell's 
'judgmental' criteria the evidence of turning- point confonnity is weak. 
In fact historical specific-cycle dynamics are divergent, as shown in Table 5. Only two 
series - residential and nomesidential structures - had the same number of cycles (12), 
and no component series had the same number as GNP (eight). The mean specific-cycle 
durations for the 12 series (column 3) emphasize the wide variations in behaviour - from 
11 quarters (just under three years) to 96 quarters (24 years). The mean of the column 3 
averages is 27 quarters, which is not very different from the mean of GNP specific-cycle 
durations, and which suggests that the latter is representative only of the average 
behaviour of the ' many activities '. 
The consumption aggregate differs in its specific-cycle behaviour from both its 
components: durables had more than twice as many cycles and nondurables only half as 
many. The closest confonnity to GNP was in durable goods and exports, each with only 
one 'extra ' cycle. Investment- sector series were in general more volatile than 
consumption: the aggregate shows 13 cycles against four in the latter. However, the 
components of investment conformed more closely than those of consumption: four of 
the five series were similar but not identical in numbers; inventories was an outlier, with 
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much more volatility than the others. Consumption had only half as many specific cycles 
as GNP; imports and exports slightly more; and investment and goverrunent purchases 
approximately half again as many. Nondurables, representing just over half of the value 
of GNP throughout the period, had only two completed cycles; and so cannot really be 
classified even loosely as ' cyclical' .33 
The closer conformity of specific--cycle numbers shown for the investment- sector series 
(Table 5) does not guarantee conformity in their timings. Table 6 shows a comparison of 
turning points in the aggregate with those in the two construction series. There are 30 
turning points in total investment; yet although 21 of these (70 percent) have equivalents 
in the two other series, the specific--cycle conformity is not as close as that figure 
suggests. There are 'missing' turning points in both component series. Those marked with 
a asterisk in the table fall within two quarters of each other in all three series: e.g., the 
first peaks in the table, at 1948:3, 1948:2 and 1948:4 respectively. There are seven such 
occurrences in each series: that is, about 23 percent of aggregate, 24 percent of residential 
and 26 percent of nonresidential turns. Those in the component series within two quarters 
of each other (but not of the investment aggregate) are marked with the symbol t . There 
are five in all , 17 and 19 percent of turns in residential and nonresidential structures 
respectively. 
Table 7 shows measures of amplitude: that is, mean peak- ta-trough decreases in levels 
and their variances for each series. Lucas ' statement that durable goods is a more volatile 
series than nondurables is supported by these data: the mean peak- trough decrease in the 
former in the postwar period is 11.3, but in the latter only 1.9 percent. GNP, with a mean 
of 2.4 percent, is the least volatile of the aggregates ; the others in ascending order are 
goverrunent purchases (3.1), consumption (3 .2) and investment (18.2). Variances follow 
the same ordering. The most volatile in amplitude is the business- inventories series, with 
33The proportions in Table 1.2 are 56 percent in 1950; 54 percent in 1970; and 58 percent 
in 1990. 
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negative as well as positive values and consequently with swings much greater than 100 
percent; the least is nondurable goods and services. Investment is the most volatile sector 
both in aggregate and in its components. Al l series except nondurables have both greater 
mean and greater maximum amplitudes than GNP. Consumption, nondurables and 
government purchases have smaller minimums. 
For the reference cycle to be an effective representation of comovements the necessary 
condition is that it should coincide with peaks and troughs in the majority of sectors . 
Table 8 shows the numbers of turning points in the 12 NIPA series occurring in the same 
quarters as NBER reference peaks and troughs. These indicate a lack of concentration of 
specific-cycle turning points at reference turns. There are two occasions, in 1958 and 
1964, in which none of the turning points coincided with the reference turn; on four other 
occasions three or less turning points coincided; on only one occasion - the trough of 
1991 - did the majority of series turn at the reference date. The mean number of 
specific-cycle peaks at reference peaks is just over three; and of troughs, about 3 Y, (that 
is, the means of columns 2 and 4); in both cases about one-quarter of the series in the 
sample. Average numbers increased after 1969170: from 2.8 to 4.0 at peaks; and from 2.8 
to 5.0 at troughs. The modal number of all turning points is four, which is only one-third 
of the series; the maximum, in 1991 , is eight, or two-thirds. 
The degree of clustering can be shown more generally by summarizing the number of 
turning-points occurring in each quarter as a frequency distribution. Figure 1 shows the 
histogram for perfectly clustered behaviour. The horizontal axis gives the number of 
turning points that may be observed in any single quarter, from zero to the maximum 
number of variables in the sample; the vertical axis shows the frequency, in quarters, of 
each observed number. The only non-zero frequencies are at the extremes - zero and 
the maximum number of turning points per quarter - because comovements imply that 
either all series or none should turn in a given quarter. 
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If such perfect clustering were observed then the relative frequencies of the zero and 
maximum classes would depend on the average length of the cycle. The zero-class would 
increase in frequency as the average cycle length increased, because fewer turning points 
would occur overall. For example, of the 192 quarters in the period 1947 to 1994, the first 
and final three quarters are excluded by the operation of the algorithm. Then, if the 
average cycle-length of GNP were, say, six years (24 quarters), then there would be 7'h 
specific cycles in the 186 quarters (since 186/24=7%, or 7'h to the nearest complete 
half- cycle). Each cycle has exactly one peak and one trough, so that in 15 out of 186 
quarters there would have been 12 turning points, and in all other quarters none. If the 
cycle length is only four years (16 quarters) then by this reckoning the maximum class 
would have had a frequency of23 - i.e., reflecting turning points occurring every eight 
quarters. Such behaviour gives the U-shaped distribution shown in Figure I . 
Results already summarized in Tables 3, 5 and 8 suggest that clustering was not the case 
historically. The frequency- distribution for the NIP A data, plotted in Figure 2, confmns 
this: it is not U-shaped, but rather skew, with a peak at unit frequency. Its zero-class has 
a comparatively low frequency, and its maximum class has zero frequency. Such a 
distribution provides little evidence of clustering. 
The Problem of Leads and Lags. Variations in specific- cycle numbers, shown in Table 
5, pose a dilemma for the investigator of timing relations. In order to determine 
systematic leads or lags over GNP it is necessary to compare equivalent turning points, 
which means the weeding out of 'extra' cycles. Table 9 shows the result of such an 
analysis for the 11 component series. Following the same criteria as for Table 4, those 
turning points without an equivalent in GNP are discarded. The extent of weeding is in 
the range 22 to 57 percent of turning points, making the results difficult to interpret. In 
particular, consumption and nondurables present problems, since both series have fewer 
turning points than GNP, the 'reference' series in this analysis. The weeding of the latter, 
which strictly speaking should not be modifted, is thus required. 
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Nevertheless, even after weeding the timings are volatile. All series but nondurables have 
substantial numbers of changes in timing (Table 9, column 8), that is from coincident to 
leading to lagging, etc. The range of these is from 13, or one every 3Y:z years on average, 
in residential structures, to two, or one every 24 years, in nondurables; the average 
number of changes is eight. All series but government purchases, which is principally a 
'lagging indicator', show instances of coincident, leading and lagging relations, more or 
less evenly divided. Maximum leads and lags are also volatile (columns 6 and 7). 
Government purchases has the largest swings, with maxima of +7 and - I 7 quarters. 
Nondurables is much less volatile, and is the only series whose maximum leads and lags, 
+2 and - 1 quarters (that is +6 and - 3 months), are of the same magnitudes as those of 
official indicators published in Survey of Current Business. 
Volatility of timing is also found within sectors. Table 10 shows the result of a 
comparison of two investment series in the same sector with similar numbers of specific 
cycles - residential and nonresidential structures. The latter is volatile in its leads and 
lags over the former, as can be seen in columns 3 and 4; and the number of changes in 
timing, shown at the bottom of the table, is still comparatively large. There were four 
leads and 18 lags, the maxima being +9 quarters, in 1984, and - 7, in 1959 and 1978. 
There were four timing changes, occurring at irregular intervals in 1964, 1965, 1984 and 
1990. 
Asymmetries. Blanchard and Fischer point out that the dominant feature of 
macroeconomic history over the past two hundred years has been output growthJ4 As 
noted by Moore and Zamowitz, growth gives rise to durational asymmetries between 
expansions and contractions. In the NBER reference cycle, for example, expansions on 
average lasted 17, and contractions 3Y:z quarters, in the period since 1947. The figures for 
GNP are 16Y:z and 2Y:z quarters respectively, and such durational asymmetries are found 
in all other series. 
34(1989) p. l. 
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There is also an asymmetry relating to the general economy. Figure 3 shows the 
percentage of variables with quarter- on-quarter increases since the beginning of 1947. 
This 'diffusion index' of expansions is a familiar measure : versions of it are published 
monthly in the Survey o/Current Business 'Business Cycle Indicators ' section. It has also 
been used as a criterion for identifying ' recessions' , as periods in which fewer than 50 
percent of variables show increases in levels3s The index shown in Figure 3 occupies the 
region above the 50-percent level in the majority of quarters since 1947, thus suggesting 
a ' diffusion asymmetry' in the US macroeconomy. 
This feature can be seen in detail in Table 11 , which gives the percent of quarters in 
which the level of each variable increased over the previous quarter. During the period 
1947 to 1994, nine of the 12 NIPA series in the present study increased in more than 60 
percent of quarters. The most persistent growth was in GNP, consumption and 
nondurables, all increasing in more than 80 percent of quarters. Only two, residential 
structures and business inventories, were close to the 50-percent level; and none was 
below 50 percent. 
Table 12 shows the relative frequencies of each level of increase and decrease per 
quarter. Column 1 gives the number of series; column 2 shows the percentage of sample 
quarters in which each number of series increased; and column 3, the percentage of 
quarters in which each number decreased. Thus, for example, all 12 series increased in 
6.3 percent of quarters (bottom row of table), but in no quarter did all 12 decrease (first 
row) . At the other end of the scale the were no quarters in which none of the 12 series 
increased; but 7.9 percent in which none decreased. In 77.0 percent of quarters the 
majority of series (i.e., seven or more) increased; in only 14.1 percent did a majority 
decrease. The statistics thus concur with GNP and reference- cycle asymmetries, 
suggesting that episodes of general 'recession' have been less likely to occur and less 
prolonged since the War. 
3S An example of such an application is in Sirnpkins (1994) p. 387. 
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V. Conclusion 
Such is the prestige of Burns and Mitchell that their' definition ' of business cycles has 
always been assumed to be an accurate description of empirical behaviour. The practice 
of reference-{fating has been justified by an appeal to prewar statistical evidence, which 
is interpreted as 'proof that the 'many economic activities' always comove. Evidence of 
postwar fluctuations shows that such an assumption is far from legitimate, and that 
economic fluctuations are, in Romer's phrase, 'a very complex phenomenon'. When a 
consistent algorithm for the identification of specific cycles in the principal NIP A time 
series is applied, the foll owing patterns of fluctuation are revealed. 
I. NBER reference dates closely match the specific cycles in GNP rather than 
comovements in the 'many activities '. The principal NIPA (Table 1.2) aggregates show 
extensive variations in specific--cycle timing and duration: only four reference turns (or 
alternatively turns in GNP) coincide with peaks or troughs in consumption, investment 
and government purchases. On only one occasion since the war has the majority of these 
series reached turning points in the same quarter as a turn in the reference cycle. 
Compared to GNP, 'extra' specific cycles occurred in investment and government 
expenditure during the 1960s and 1980s; cycles in consumption were' skipped' in the 
same periods. There are also instances of 'double ' peaks and troughs, similar to those 
found by Burns and Mitchell. Moreover, fluctuations in nondurables and services, 
representing half the value of postwar US economic output, are so rare that it is 
questionable whether they are 'cyclical ' in the sense of the ' definition '. 
2. Divergences in timing occur even when 'extraneous' turning points are 'weeded ' 
following interwar NBER practice: for example, only half the 'weeded' turns in 
investment occur within two quarters of equivalent GNP turns. There are also divergences 
among sectoral components: less than half the investment sector series reached peaks or 
troughs within two quarters of equivalents in their aggregate. Such behaviour suggests 
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that no aggregate is an accurate representation of the specific-cycle characteristics of its 
components in the US economy since World War II. 
3. Leads and lags, even after 'weeding', are unstable and unpreclictable. This is a function 
of the variability of specific-cycle duration and timing. However, the extent of weeding 
required for the lead/lag analysis is so great that the results are difficult to interpret. 
4. Sectoral amplitudes also vary, consumption being less volatile than investment. In this 
case behaviour is closer to that assumed in theoretical models - for example, by Lucas 
(1977). 
5. Postwar expansions and contractions in the macroeconomy have been asynunetric; the 
former are more diffused and persistent than the latter. 
6. 'Detrending' produces markedly different specific-cycle dynamics from those of the 
original series. The analysis of 'growth cycles' relying on deviations from a smooth 
time- trend is therefore unsatisfactory. 
Comovements are not found among US macroeconomic time series in the period since 
Measuring Business Cycles was published. It is unlikely that such a result would have 
surprised Burns and Mitchell, for it lends support to their view that each episode is 
'unique ', and that historical dynamics are behaviourally divergent. The stylization of the 
reference cycle has made it relevant to the formulation of a theory of business cycles 
rather than as a description of actual behaviour. 
None of the 'business cycle facts' on which current research is based is therefore reliable. 
Although the reference cycle tracks turning points in GNP with great skill and 
consistency, it is not useful in tracking or preclicting component fluctuations . 
Consumption, for example, had only half the number of specific cycles as GNP; 
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investment, half again as many. By using 'reference dates ' obtained from an industrial 
production series to compare pre- and post- war 'business cycles', Romer's analysis is 
at best valid for one sectoral aggregate. As has been demonstrated, no 'general ' state of 
business conditions can be inferred from any single time series or index in the postwar 
period. The historiography of postwar stabilization as mere statistical illusion is certainly 
not valid on the evidence of a modified reference chronology alone. Turning points in 
Romer's index series do not capture the behaviour of, say, consumption or the service 
sector, both of which have longer and gentler specific cycles than any production series. 
On the contrary, the analysis of postwar ' stabilization ' requires a multi- sectoral 
approach. This is implicit in Watson's conclusion that differences between pre- and 
postwar durations are the artifacts of the volatile series used to determine the prewar 
reference dates. On this basis he should perhaps have been more cautious about 
generalizing from univariate measures and about making ' reference ', rather than 
sector- by- sector comparisons. His data nevertheless point to the conclusion of the 
present study, and could even have preempted it had he looked beyond reference 
measures. At all events there is nothing in the present results inconsistent with Watson's 
analysis of specific cycles . 
Macroeconomists seem thoroughly to have misunderstood Measuring Business Cycles. 
Their theoretical models are invalidated by the assumption of comovements, justified by 
the supposed ' business cycle facts' of Bwns and Mitchell. They fail to recognize that 
historical episodes are all different, that comovements are not found in empirical data, 
and hence that univariate measures carmot adequately represent the behaviour of the 
' many activities'. Their models need thus to be recast to take account of sectoral 
divergences. 
Diffusion asyrnmetries imply that, given a sufficient rate of economic growth, 
' recessions ' will always be more difficult to identify by the BER '3- D' criteria than 
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expansions. Hence the problems of 'recession'-dating noted by Hall are likely to be 
encountered normally rather than exceptionally. Given strong growth since the war, 
asymmetric behaviour in an epoch of strong growth may have been an effect of 
' accelerations and retardations of a more fundamental process' . 
In answer to the question posed earlier: the US reference cycle has coincided with 
specific cycles in GNP rather than with comovements in the 'many activities '. The 
statistical evidence of postwar economic fluctuations, when not biased to enforce 
conformity to a reference cycle, suggests that the former are 'largely unsystematic and 
unpredictable' , and can only be measured by ' a vector of many diverse activities that are 
not reducible to any single aggregate' (per Moore and Zamowitz). 
The three criteria for comovements set out in Section II have not been met: turning points 
are not clustered; numbers of specific cycles diverge; and leads and lags are unstable. 
There are hence no 'general ' business cycles in the postwar US economy answering to 
Burns and Mitchell 's defInition. It would appear that sectoral durations and timings, 
especially of consumption and investment, have few common features . Indeed, given the 
behaviour of the principal components of consumption, a good proportion of US 
economic activity may not have been cyclical at all in the sense commonly understood. 
The best that can be said is that there may be ' several sets of cycles running 
concurrently', as Burns and Mitchell speculated: i.e. , in certain areas of industrial 
production, investment, government expenditure and international trade. On the other 
hand the distinction between stylized summary statistics and the actual history of business 
cycles, which was the essence of Burns and MitchelI ' s approach, is validated by the 
results of the present study. 
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TABLE 1 
US Reference Dates and Turning Points in GNP, 1948- 1991 (Year: Quarter) 
Reference Dates GNP 
Romer NBER 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Peaks Troughs Peaks Troughs Peaks Troughs 
1948:4 1949:4 1948:4 1949:4 1948:4 1949:2 
1953:3 1954:3 1953 :2 1954:2 1953 :2 1954:4 
1957:3 1958:2 1957:3 1958:2 1957:3 1958: 1 
1960:2 1961 : 1 1960:2 1961 :1 1960:1 1960:4 
1969:4 1970:4 1969:4 1970:4 1969:3 1970:1 
1973:4 1975:3 1973:4 1975:1 1973 :4 1975:1 
1980: 1 1980:3 1980: 1 1980:3 1980: 1 1980:2 
1981 :3 1983:2 1981 :3 1982:4 1981:3 1982:3 
1990:3 1991 : 1 1990:3 1991:1 1990:2 1991 : 1 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 





1951 :3 1952:3 
1953: 1 1954:2 
1955:3 1958:2 
1959:2 1961 :1 
1962:2 1964:4 
1966: I 1967:2 
1968:3 1970:4 
1973: I 1975: 1 
1978:4 1980:3 
1981 : 1 1982:4 
1984:1 1986:4 




Specific Cycles outside Bwns and Mitchell ' s Durational Limits 
a. Below Five Quarters 
Series 
Changes in business inventories 
Imports 
Private domestic investment 




b. Above 48 Quarters 




1953 :2- 1973 :3 
TABLE 3 
Turning Points found b~ the Algorithm in PrinciEaI ComEonents of GNP 
Government Private Domestic Personal Consumption 
Purchases Investment Expenditures 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough 
1949:3 1950:3 1948:3 1949:2 
1950:4 1952:2 1950:3 1951:2 
1953 :4 1955:2 1953:2 1953 :4 1953:2 1953:4 
1958:4 1960: 1 1955:4 1958:2 1958: 1 
1960:1 1960:4 1960:2 
1962:4 
1964:2 1965: 1 1966:2 1967:2 
1968:3 1970:2 1967:4 
1971 :2 1969:3 1970:4 
1972: 1 1973:2 
1975:4 1976:3 1973:4 1975: 1 1973 :3 1974:4 
1980:2 1980:4 1978:4 1980:3 1979:4 1980:2 
1982:2 1981:3 1982:4 1981 :4 
1982:4 1983:4 1984:3 1985:3 
1987:4 1988:3 1986: 1 1986:4 
1988:3 1988:4 




Principal NIPA Aggregates: Turning Points Equivalent to those in GNP after 'Weeding' 
{Year: Quarter} 
GNP Government Purchases Private Domestic Personal Consumption Expenditures 
Investment 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough 
1948:4 1949:2 1949:3 1950:3 1948:3 1949:2* 1950:3 1951:2 
1953:2 1954:2 1953 :4* 1955:2 1953:2* 1953 :4 1953 :2* 1953:4 
1957:3 1958:1 1958:4 1960: 1 1955:4 1958:2 1958:1* 
1960:1 1960:4 1964:2 1965:1 1960:1* 1960:4* 1960:2 
1969:3 1970:1 1968:3 1970:2* 1969:3* 1970:4 
1973 :4 1975:1 1972:1 1976:3 1973 :4* 1975:1* 1973 :3 1974:4 
1980:1 1980:2 1980:2* 1980:4* 1978:4 1980:3 1979:4 1980:2* 
1981 :3 1982:3 1982:4 1983:4 1981 :3* 1982:4 
1990:2 1991: I 1991 :3 1992:3 1989:3 1991 : 1 * 1990:3 1991 :1* 
*Tuming points within ±two quarters of an equivalent in GNP 
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TABLE4A 
'Weeded' Turning Points in Principal Components of GNP 
(Year: Quarter) 
Government Purchases Investment Consumption 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







1975:4 1982:2 1981 :4 
1984:3 1985:3 
1986:1 1986:4 




Completed Postwar Specific Cycles in 12 NIPA Series: 
Numbers and Average Lengths 
Average Duration 
Series Number (quarters) 
GNP 8 24 
Personal consumption expenditures 4 48 
Durable goods 9 21 
Nondurable goods and services 2 96 
Private domestic investment 13 15 
Residential structures 12 16 
Nonresidential structures 12 16 
Producers durable equipment II 17 
Changes in business inventories 18 II 
Imports II 17 
Exports 9 21 
Governrnent purchases II 17 
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TABLE 6 
Turning Points in Two Construction Series: Comparison with Aggregate Investment 
Construction Sector 
Private Domestic Investment Residential Structures Nonresidential Structures 
Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough 
1947:4 
1948:3* 1949:2* 1948:2* 1949:2* 1948:4* 1949:4* 
1950:4 1952:2 1950:3 1951:3t 1951 :2 1951 :4t 
1953 :2 1953:4 1953 :2 1953 :4 
1955:4 1958:2* 1955:2 1958:2* 1956:4 1958:3* 
1960:1 1960:4 1959:2 1961 :1t 1961 :1 1961 :3 t 
1962:4 1964:1 1964:4 1962:3 1963: 1 
1966:2 1967:2* 1965:2 1967:1* 1966:3 1967:2* 
1967:4 
1969:3* 1970:4 1969:1* 1970:2 1969:3* 1971:4 
1973 :4 1975 :1* 1973 :1t 1975:1* 1973:3t 1975:1* 
1978:4 1978:1 1977:1 
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(TABLE 6: Continuation) 
Private Domestic Investment Residential Structures Nonresidential Structures 
Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough 
1980:3* 1978:2 1980:2* 1980:1 1980:3* 
1981 :3 1982:4 1982:1 
1984:3 1985:3 1984:2 1984:4 1982:1 1983:2 
1986:1 1986:3 1985:2 
1986:4 1987:4 
1988:3 1988:4 1988: I 
1989:3 1989:4t 1989:2t 
1991:1 1990:2t 1991 :1 1990:1t 1994: 1 
*Turning points within ±two quarters of an equivalent in the aggregate 
t Additional turning points in the two construction series occurring within ±two quarters of each other 
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TABLE 7 
Peak- to- Trough Amplitude Measures in 12 NIP A Series 
Series 
GNP 
Personal consumption expenditure 
Durable goods 
Nondurables and services 
Private domestic investment 
Residential structures 
Nonresidential structures 
Producers durable equipment 





























25 .2 18.9 
34 11.5 240.6 



















Numbers of Specific-Cycle Peaks and Troughs in 12 NIPA Series Occurring 
Simultaneously with NBER Reference Dates 
{Year: Quarter~ 
NBERPeak Number of Peaks NBER Trough Number of Troughs 
1948:4 2 1949:4 4 
1953 :2 5 1954:2 2 
1957:3 2 1958:2 0 
1960:2 3 1961 : 1 4 
1969:4 0 1970:4 4 
1973:4 3 1975: 1 4 
1980:1 5 1980:3 4 
1981 :3 4 1982:4 4 
1990:3 4 1991:1 8 
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TABLE 9 
Anal~sis of Timing relations in 11 Com2onent Series against GNP Turning Points 
Maximum Maximum Number of 
Percentage Number of Number of Number of Lead Lag Timing 
Series Weeded Leads Lags Coincidences (quarters) (quarters) Changes 
Consumptiont 56 5 3 2 +2 - 7 4 
Private domestic investment 40 6 4 8 +7 -3 11 
Government purchases 28 3 15 0 +7 - 17 4 
Durable goods 22 9 7 2 +5 - 13 8 
Nondurable goods and servicest 43 2 +2 -1 2 
Producers durable equipment 26 21 9 6 +3 - 3 8 
Residential structures 38 8 5 5 +9 - \1 13 
Nonresidential structures 33 5 9 4 +10 - 12 11 
Imports 41 6 7 3 +3 -3 11 
Exports 28 5 11 2 +22 - 10 9 
Changes in business inventories* 57 6 4 8 +11 - 3 11 
*Inventories rise during ' recessions ' . Timings of peaks have thus been measured against troughs in GNP, and vice versa. 
tSeries with fewer turning points than GNP; the latter is 'weeded' in these cases. 
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TABLE 10 
Comparison of Timings in Two Investment Series 
Residential Structures 
Peak Trough 
(year: quarter) (year: quarter) 
1948:2 1949:2 
1950:3 1951 :3 
1953:2 1953 :4 
1955:2 1958:2 
1959:2 1961:1 
1964: 1 1964:4 
1965:2 1967:1 
1969: 1 1970:2 
1973:1 1975: 1 
1978:2 1980:2 
1984:2 1984:4 
1990:1 1991 : 1 
Number of changes in timing 
Nonresidential Structures 
Lead( + )lLag( - ) over 
Lead(+)lLag(- ) over Residential Structures 
Residential Structures at Trough (in 
at Peak (in quarters) quarters) 
- 2 - 2 
- 3 - 1 
-6 - 1 
- 7 - 2 
+2 +7 
- 5 - 1 
- 2 - 6 
- 2 - 1 
- 7 - 1 
+9 +5 









Private direct investment 
Government expenditure 







Changes in business inventories 















Relative Frequencies of Increases and Decreases over Previous Quarter 
Number of Series Percent of Quarters Percent of Quarters 
with Increases with Decreases 
0 0 7.9 
1.0 13 .6 
2 1.6 15.2 
3 3.1 17.8 
4 2.6 9.9 
5 5.8 12.6 
6 8.9 8.9 
7 12.6 5.8 
8 11.0 2.6 
9 16.8 3.1 
10 16.2 1.6 
II 14.1 1.0 





Figure I. Frequency Distribution, Clustered Turning Points 
Maximum 
Number of Tuming Points per Quarter 
43 
Figure 2. Turning- point Frequency Distributions, 12 NIP A Series, 1947-1994 
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Figure 3, Diffusion of Quarterly Increases in Levels, 12 NIPA Series, 1947-1994 
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